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Preface 
 
 
What is the ideal phytosanitary policy? The Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agricul-
ture & Innovation has asked LEI to develop a framework based on which the 
government can review its role in phytosanitary policy. The framework should 
contain a step by step plan which can be used with regard to new developments 
and for a range of phytosanitary problems. This report contains the theoretical 
framework that can be used for this purpose. The 'Towards Phytopia' frame-
work has been tested several times with representatives from the Ministry of 
EL&I. The framework has already played a role in the dialogue about phytosani-
tary responsibilities which the government is conducting with industry and social 
parties.  
 The researchers would like to thank H. Smolders and H. Schollaart and the 
other members of staff from the Phytosanitary cluster for their enthusiastic in-
put and cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
Prof Dr R.B.M. Huirne 
Managing Director LEI  
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Summary  
 
 
S.1 Key results 
 
It is possible to reform phytosanitary policy. Entrepreneurs could be 
given more responsibility for controlling those invasive plant pests and 
diseases which they are able and willing to control.  
  
The infestation of plant products with invasive plant pests and diseases results 
in reduced prosperity due to market failure. Market failure occurs when the co-
ordination of the free market mechanism is unable to bring about an optimum 
balance between supply and demand. Market failure is the result of external ef-
fects and asymmetry of information in the plant product market. (See Paragraph 
2.2 and Paragraph 2.3) 
 The government corrects this market failure when public interests are at 
stake. The government can give entrepreneurs more responsibility if the fol-
lowing three questions can be answered positively: (See Chapter 4) 
1.  Are the entrepreneurs aware of the risks concomitant with the trade in plant 
products?  
2. Is it in their interest to reduce the risk?  
3.  Are they capable of reducing the risk? 
 
 If these three questions can be answered positively, the government can 
give more responsibility to entrepreneurs.  
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Figure S.1 Administrative framework for phytosanitary policy 
 
Source: LEI. 
 
 
S.2 Complementary findings 
 
Phytosanitary policy is more effective when costs are divided according to the 
principle 'the polluter pays'. Those responsible for contamination are given an 
economic incentive to reduce risks. This calls for a reversal of the burden of 
proof for imputability. More research is required into the practical feasibility of 
this. (See Paragraph 4.4) 
 Adjustments to phytosanitary policy can only occur if the international 
frameworks allow for this. The Netherlands is an important exporting country. 
However, many importing countries would not benefit by the liberalisation of 
phytosanitary policy, because this limits the scope for engaging in trade politics. 
For this reason, the international dissemination of these research results will 
have to be done diplomatically. 
 
 
3. Goal:  
compensate reduced prosperity with as 
little governmental interference as possible 
2. Philosophy of control:  
governance 
4. Analyse interests 
and measures: 
choose governance method 
7. Determine 
effectiveness and 
efficiency 
5. Determine set 
of instruments 
6. Determine costs 
and benefits 
1. Problem:  
nature of the market failure 
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S.3 Methodology 
 
The central research question posed by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Innovation was: what would a more ideal phytosanitary policy 
look like? The study was carried out based on the assumption that there is no 
national or international phytosanitary policy and that third countries follow 
Dutch phytosanitary policy.  
 The policy framework was developed by combining economic theories with 
administrative science. Economics was used in the analysis of phytosanitary 
problems and in order to sketch out market failure; administrative science was 
used to develop a policy framework from which to address these problems. 
The fundamental principles were: 
- Maximum deregulation: privately what can be done, publicly what must be 
done. 
- Responsibility as decentralised as possible: individually what can be done, 
collectively what must be done. 
- Policy will be given shape as effectively as possible with as little effort as 
possible.  
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Samenvatting 
 
 
S.1 Belangrijkste uitkomsten 
 
Het fytosanitair beleid kan hervormd worden door te toetsen of 
ondernemers invasieve plantenziekten en -plagen willen én kunnen 
beheersen. 
 
Besmetting van plantaardige producten met invasieve plantenziekten leidt tot 
welvaartverlies door marktfalen. Marktfalen komt door het optreden van externe 
effecten en informatie-asymmetrie in de markt voor plantaardige producten.  
 De overheid is verantwoordelijk voor het corrigeren van dit marktfalen als 
publieke belangen in het geding zijn. Zij kan daarbij meer dan nu gebeurt gebruik 
maken van ondernemers.  
 Of dit mogelijk is, hangt af van drie factoren die getoetst worden in een be-
stuurskundig kader:  
1. Zijn de ondernemers op de hoogte van de risico's die gepaard gaan met 
de handel in plantaardige producten? 
2. Hebben zij belang bij het verminderen van het risico? 
3. Zijn zij in staat het risico te verminderen? 
 
 Wanneer deze drie vragen met ja beantwoord worden, kan de overheid meer 
verantwoordelijkheid bij het bedrijfsleven leggen.  
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Figuur S.1 Bestuurskundig kader fytosanitair beleid 
 
Bron: LEI. 
 
 
S.2 Overige uitkomsten 
 
Het fytosanitair beleid wint aan effectiviteit, wanneer de lasten worden verdeeld 
volgens het principe 'de vervuiler betaalt'. Veroorzakers krijgen een economi-
sche prikkel om de risico's te verminderen. Dit vraagt om omkering van de be-
wijslast voor verwijtbaarheid. De praktische haalbaarheid hiervan zal verder 
onderzocht moeten worden.  
 Aanpassing van het fytosanitair beleid kan alleen plaatsvinden wanneer de in-
ternationale kaders daar ruimte voor geven. Nederland is een belangrijk expor-
terend land. Veel landen die importeren hebben geen belang bij liberalisering 
van het fytosanitair beleid. Het internationaal uitdragen van deze onderzoeks-
resultaten zal daarom diplomatiek moeten plaatsvinden. 
 
 
3. Doel:  
compenseren welvaartsverlies met 
zo min mogelijk overheidsbemoeienis 
2. Sturingsfilosofie: 
governance  
4. Analyse van belangen 
en maatregelen: 
kies sturingsmodel 
7. Bepaal effectiviteit 
en efficiëntie 
5. Bepaal 
instrumentarium 
6. Bepaal kosten 
en baten 
1. Probleem:  
aard van het marktfalen 
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S.3 Methode 
 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag van het ministerie van EL&I was: hoe ziet het fyto-
sanitair beleid er idealiter uit? Het onderzoek is uitgevoerd vanuit de aannamen 
dat er geen nationaal of internationaal fytosanitair beleid is en dat derde landen 
het Nederlandse fytosanitair beleid volgen.  
 Het beleidskader is ontwikkeld door theorieën uit de economie te combine-
ren met de bestuurskunde. De economische discipline is gebruikt voor de ana-
lyse van fytosanitaire problemen en het in kaart brengen van het marktfalen; 
de bestuurskundige discipline voor ontwikkeling van een beleidskader om deze 
problemen aan te pakken. Uitgangspunten daarbij waren: 
- maximale deregulering: privaat wat kan, publiek wat moet;  
- verantwoordelijkheid zoveel mogelijk decentraal: individueel wat kan, 
collectief wat moet; 
- beleid wordt zo effectief mogelijk vormgegeven met zo min mogelijk 
inspanning.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Phytosanitary policy focuses on combating and controlling invasive organisms 
which are harmful to plants and plant products. The phytosanitary policy field 
was created because importing countries wanted guarantees about plant health 
and exporting countries decided to give such guarantees to stimulate trade. 
 At present, the government has a difficult role with regard to phytosanitary 
policy, partly as a result of international phytosanitary agreements. In view of 
the developments (including increasing global trade, better detection methods 
and increasing numbers of quarantine organisms), one wonders whether the 
government is willing or able to continue to play this role and whether it would 
be possible to place more responsibility on private parties. The challenge facing 
phytosanitary policy is to place responsibility for controlling phytosanitary risks 
where it is possible in terms of social responsibility. Social responsibility means 
that the economy, landscape and nature, biodiversity, environment, food 
certainty and safety are optimally served.  
 In order to be able to define the government's role and thus the role of pri-
vate parties, there is a need for a review framework for phytosanitary policy. 
Based on such a framework, policy choices can be made and justified.  
 
 
1.2 Goal 
 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework that can be used to reform 
phytosanitary policy. Based on the framework, the government can indicate 
which tasks it will assume itself and how policy instruments can be effectively 
and efficiently used. In outline, this framework provides the answer to the follow-
ing questions: 
- What?  
What are the goals and ambitions which the government sets itself in the 
phytosanitary policy? The answer to this question is a vision focused on the 
international, the European and the national context; 
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- Who?  
To whom can the phytosanitary responsibilities be allocated based on the 
subsidiarity principle? The subsidiarity principle states that public interested 
are best represented at the lowest level at which all the relevant external ef-
fects can be internalised. Two dimensions are important here: 
- public - private 
Privately where possible, publicly where necessary; 
- collective - individual 
Individually where possible, collectively where necessary. 
- How?  
How can the Dutch government apply the appropriate policy instruments to 
achieve the phytosanitary goals? 
 
 
1.3 Assumptions  
 
The following assumptions are made in this report.  
1. There is a phytosanitary problem, but no phytosanitary policy. This has the 
following implications: 
a. There is not yet an International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). Con-
sequently, there is no EU policy, such as the Phytosanitary Directive. 
b. Third countries from which the Netherlands imports products or to which 
the Netherlands used to export products have no phytosanitary policy 
either, but will be faced with phytosanitary problems at the same time as 
the Netherlands. The assumption is that third countries will follow the 
Netherlands and respond similarly to phytosanitary problems. 
 
 In the elaboration, Chapter 5 indicates the extent to which the phytosanitary 
policy's scope for manoeuvre will be restricted as a result of the IPPC, the 
Phytosanitary Directive and subsequently the implementation of phytosanitary 
policy by third countries.  
 
2. Phytosanitary problems can have an impact on five social issues 
(Phytosanitary vision LNV, 2009): 
a. Strong competitive power: contamination by harmful organisms reduces 
the quality of products. To prevent this, phytosanitary barriers can be 
erected, but not trade barriers. 
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b. Nice landscape and valuable nature: harm to plants in nature and land-
scape affects the landscape and disrupts the ecological equilibrium, 
even when measures are taken to remove these plants. 
c. Preserve biodiversity: the introduction of harmful organisms can threaten 
the survival of native species. 
d. Healthy environment: preventing the introduction or tackling harmful or-
ganisms with chemicals can have a negative impact on the environment. 
e. Food certainty and safety: damage caused to food crops by harmful or-
ganisms can lead to loss of production and in the long term may threat-
en food certainty or food safety. 
3. Limiting conditions when forming the policy framework are: 
a. Maximum deregulation in the case of the same results in phytosanitary 
terms: the responsibility will be born privately where possible, publicly 
where necessary.  
b. Support - subsidiarity: the responsibility will be born individually where 
possible and collectively where necessary. 
c. Effectiveness: the phytosanitary system will be designed in such a way 
that goals are achieved. 
d. Efficiency: the goals are achieved with the least possible effort and 
resources. 
 
 
1.4 Approach 
  
The research was conducted in partnership with the members of the Phytosani-
tary cluster of the AKV department of the Ministry of EL&I. It started with the 
question regarding when government intervention is necessary or desirable. In 
order to answer this question, previous LEI research was used as the basis 
(Bunte, 2004; Janssens et al., 2006). The resulting analysis was discussed with 
the members of the Phytosanitary cluster and elaborated using practical ques-
tions. The policy framework was then developed based on recent policy in-
sights, economic theory and practical information. This framework was also 
explained and applied in a workshop. Finally, the current regulations and func-
tioning of the phytosanitary policy was compared with the vision of the Phyto-
sanitary cluster of EL&I and with existing international policy frameworks.  
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1.5 Structure 
 
The report is structured as follows. After this Introduction, Chapter 2 provides 
analyses why the government is concerned about phytosanitary policy. In Chap-
ter 3, the vision concerning governance is described. Its application takes place 
in Chapter 4 in which the policy framework is developed. Chapter 5 compares it 
with existing international frameworks. In Chapter 6, the report concludes with a 
discussion, conclusions and recommendations. 
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2 Reasons for government intervention? 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The first question that needs to be answered with regard to the formation of a 
vision on phytosanitary policy is the motivation of the government to become in-
volved with phytosanitary policy. This question is discussed using economic 
theory. The government is striving to optimise national welfare. National welfare 
is the extent to which the needs of a country's inhabitants can be met by divert-
ing scarce alternative appropriable resources. These may be the need for 
goods and services, but also the need for nature, open space, a clean environ-
ment, et cetera. These create demand and satisfying that demand puts pres-
sure on scarce resources. In many cases, the market manages to achieve an 
optimal allocation of goods and services. The theory of welfare economy is 
based on the assumption that the market functions optimally and leads to max-
imum welfare. This is welfare distribution where no one can be made better off 
by making someone worse of: the Pareto-optimum. However, the welfare distri-
bution that the market achieves for a given income distribution need not be the 
distribution desired by society. Furthermore, the market does not always func-
tion optimally. In that case, we refer to market failure. Economic theory attrib-
utes a role to the government in the allocation, when supply and demand are not 
in equilibrium (Stiglitz, 2000). Market failure may be the result of external ef-
fects (whereby under certain conditions there is an insufficient supply of certain 
goods), or information asymmetry either of market power of companies. For the 
phytosanitary policy, external effects and information asymmetry are the main 
important factors. 
 
 
2.2 External effects 
 
For the government, external effects constitute a reason to exercise control in 
satisfying needs for goods and services. By needs for goods and services, we 
also mean the need for fresh air, clean water, no noise pollution, et cetera. If 
production or consumption involves unintended effects on the satisfaction of 
needs (welfare) of another, we talk about external effects. Social debate shows 
which needs of the citizens (the citizen as a consumer, producer, employer, et 
cetera) is emphasised (Heertje, 2006). 
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 In order to understand how market failure results from external effects, two 
generic properties of products are important: excludability and rivalry. Excluda-
bility refers to the possibility of excluding people from using it. Rivalry is about 
the degree to which consumption of the product by a person excludes con-
sumption by another person. Based on the dimensions excludability and rivalry, 
four types of products can be identified:1 common goods, public goods, club 
goods and private goods (Figure 2.1).  
  
Figure 2.1 Classification of goods 
 
 
 In the case of purely private goods, we talk about excludability and rivalry. 
For purely public goods, there are also collective provisions; there is no exclud-
ability or rivalry. Private goods are also called individual goods: they can be di-
vided into units which can be sole to individual people. The person who decides 
to purchase a product is often the one who pays for it and uses it. Public goods 
are purely collective goods, whereby there is often a distinction between deci-
sion, payment and use.  
 The other goods are mixed forms. For group goods, consumption is not ex-
cludable, but there is rivalry. Consumers cannot be excluded from consumption, 
but consumption by one person is at the expense of consumption by someone 
else. Without regulation, common goods will soon become depleted due to over 
consumption (tragedy of the commons).  
 For club goods, this is exactly the opposite: consumers may be excluded 
from use, but consumption by one is not at the expense of someone else.  
                                                 
1 For a more extensive discussion, see Janssens et al. (2006). 
Club goods 
Microsoft Office 
Hoge Veluwe Non-rival 
Rival 
Non-excludable Excludable 
Public goods 
Sea dyke 
Hills 
Private goods 
Potato 
Car  
Common goods 
Sea fish 
Groundwater 
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 It is only for private goods, whereby there are no external effects, that the 
market is able to produce them in the right quantities and at the right price. With 
regard to public goods, the inability to exclude consumers leads to the risk of 
free-riding. Once an individual has decided to supply the item in question, an-
other person can consume the item without paying, due to its non-excludable 
nature. Consequently, the public good will probably be not produced, or in insuf-
ficient quantities. This means that production will have to be created in some 
other way than via the market system of supply and demand. The alternative is 
a political system via regulation or by open financing.  
 The phytosanitary policy focuses on the market for plant-based products. 
When the applicable theory about product classification is applied, plant-based 
products will generally be classified as private goods. However, this is only the 
case to a certain degree. We talk about purely private goods when all the prop-
erties of the product are valued in the price, or when there are no external ef-
fects. This is not the case. The production of and trade in plant-based products 
is linked with the risk of an infestation or disease of which sometimes the seller 
but certainly the buyer is ignorant. This risk is manifested as a negative external 
effect: it is unintended and has a generally negative effect on the satisfaction 
of the need of the buyer and third parties who are not involved in the production 
of and trading in contaminated plants or plant-based products, such as other 
growers and citizens. These needs have been described as the five social 
goals: need for competitive power, nice landscape and nature, biodiversity, 
healthy environment and food certainty and safety.  
 The negative external effects bear the character of a public good. 'Con-
sumption' thereof is non-excludable and 'consumption' thereof is non-rival be-
cause the consequence for one are not 'at the expense' of the consequences 
for another. The conclusion is that in the pricing of plant-based products, no ac-
count is taken of the risk of importing an infestation or disease. This price is ac-
tually too low (Bunte, 2004).  
 The government has various options for the negative external effects: gov-
ernment levies to internalise the costs of the negative external effects in the 
price of direct standards. The costs of the negative external effects are actually 
the costs associated with producing another good, i.e. the creation of a protec-
tion against the risks of contamination of a plant with a harmful organism. The 
creation of protection against risks for the plant health will not occur naturally 
via the market because 'the production of this protection' is associated with 
positive external effects. These positive external effects are not expressed in 
the price, whereby there is no incentive in the market to organise these activi-
ties. There is no market where pricing brings equilibrium between the demand 
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for biodiversity, for example, and the supply of protection against risks for plant 
health. It can be stated that the good 'protection against risks for plant health' is 
a public good.  
 
 
2.3 Information asymmetry 
 
A second form of market failure which is important to the phytosanitary policy is 
the occurrence of information asymmetry: during the transaction, the seller and 
buyer do not have access to the same information. Usually, the seller knows 
more about a product than the buyer. He can exploit this advantage by using 
the ignorance of the buyer. After a while, the buyer will no longer accept this 
and will want to see guarantees incorporated in the contract. Because the seller 
cannot give this certainty, fewer transactions will be conducted than is optimal 
in terms of the welfare theory. In addition, the terms of the contract will not be 
optimal.  
 In theory, the problem of information asymmetry can be offset by means of 
insurance. The seller covers himself against the possible risks resulting from a 
transaction, if he is held liable. However, such insurance is not automatically 
created in the market for the following reasons: 
1. contrary selection 
Producers have information about their own risk profile. Companies with a 
high risk profile benefit from an insurance, while companies with a low profile 
do not, given the level of the premium. Because then only companies with a 
high risk profile opt for insurance, the premium will have to rise. The mecha-
nism will repeat itself and ultimately no one will be prepared to get insur-
ance. 
2. moral risk 
Entrepreneurs can influence the risk. When this risk is insured, the incentive 
for the entrepreneur to reduce the risk will be lower. This results in higher 
social costs than desired.  
 
 The above reasons also apply on the market for insurance against phyto-
sanitary risks. There is a huge variation in the risk profile and the risk can be in-
fluenced by the entrepreneur.  
 There is a paradox in the analyses about external effects and information 
asymmetry. Due to the existence of the external effects, there are too many 
transactions (price is too low), while information asymmetry leads to fewer 
transactions. The reason for this is that the analysis of the external effects con-
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centrates on the effects of transactions for third parties, i.e. the consequences 
are transferred to others than the seller and the buyer. The analysis of the in-
formation asymmetry is focused on the consequences for the seller and buyer 
themselves. In the phytosanitary domain, the consequences for the buyers (con-
tract parties) and third parties are at stake. Third parties are the other entrepre-
neurs from the plant sector and other actors in society.  
 
Figure 2.2  Impact of external effects and information asymmetry 
 
 
Red arrows: external effects. 
Green arrow: information asymmetry. 
 
 
2.4 Public debate 
 
For the government, market failure is the reason why it is intervening in the 
market of plant-based products. Incidentally, no account has been taken of the 
fact that the risks in terms of time are not stable. The list of potential threats 
changes constantly. However, needs change too. The need for the public good 
'biodiversity' or a healthy environment has grown in recent years, or has at least 
become a clear part of the public debate.  
  
  
  
  
Social goals as defined in EL&I's Phytosanitary vision  
Seller Product Buyer 
Competitive 
power 
Biodiversity Environment Nature and 
landscape 
Food 
certainty 
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 It is good to realise that government intervention may be linked with negative 
external effects (government failure) which in turn lead to government interven-
tion with possible external effects, et cetera. However, market failure and gov-
ernment failure both occur and this is a constant subject of political debate 
about what the best allocation mechanism is for which goods and services.  
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3 Governance 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
If it is clear that the government has a task, this begs the question how the gov-
ernment can best perform that task. Which governance philosophy will the gov-
ernment apply what responsibility will the government take and what is viewed 
as a task for the social actors? The options open to the government are deter-
mined by social opinions about the role of the government. These opinions are 
subject to change. On one side of the spectrum is a centralistic government 
which prescribes everything for its citizens and on the other side a government 
which does not intervene at all and lets the market get on with its work. Depend-
ing on the role that the government wants to play, it selects the functions it 
wishes to perform or those which it would rather leave to private parties. In the 
choices made by the government, different levels can be distinguished. These 
levels are briefly discussed in this chapter, distinguishing between policy prepa-
ration and implementation. This study primarily focuses on policy preparation.  
 
 
3.2 Role and functions of government 
 
At the highest level, the classic economic functions of government are distin-
guished. This concerns the allocation of the production factors over the applica-
tion options, the redistribution of income and the stabilisation of the macro-
economic development. In this research, we limit ourselves to the allocation 
function. The argument for the government for exercising the allocation function 
was discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Government decision-making is a matter 
of weighing the interests of consumers, producers, employees and tradesmen, 
citizens in action groups and lobbies, et cetera. The interests of these groups 
are partially different and/or contrary. Merely applying the Paretian welfare the-
ory, which exclusively considers the allocation in terms of the preferences of 
the consumers, is thus insufficient for the government. In this role play, the 
government has a coordinating task and influences the allocation of resources 
(Heertje, 2006).  
 In order to achieve its goals, the government formulates policy. The question 
is which policy approach leads to the desire results. Choices for governance 
methods and policy instruments play an important role here. Choosing a govern-
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ance philosophy and the way in which the government wants to govern is the 
second level and the core of this chapter. In the framework of this research, 
several definitions are important (Selnes, 2000): 
- governance philosophy 
A non-sector-bound vision of governance based on an idea of social pro-
cesses and the related role and division of tasks between governments and 
social actors. 
- governance concept 
A governance philosophy combined with ideas about the choice of instru-
ments and with a clear reference to a policy sector (in this case the phyto-
sanitary policy). 
- governance instrument 
Resources allocated by policy implementers to affect certain governance 
results and effects. 
- governance style 
The way in which the government (the Ministry of EL&I) approaches govern-
ance: the extent to which it is focused on reaching consensus with other 
parties and the extent to which it adopts an active of reactive approach. 
- governance model 
Ideal integration of governance philosophy, governance concepts and 
governance instruments into a cohesive entity. This is studied in more depth 
in paragraph 3.3. 
 
 
3.3 Governance philosophy and governance models 
 
Under the influence of social processes and the increased influence of informa-
tion technology, there is a shift in governance approaches: from 'government' 
to 'governance'. In its Bevrijdende Kaders [Liberating Frameworks] (2002), the 
RMO (Council for Social Developments) asserts that the Netherlands is in a tran-
sition period towards new governance concepts. The RMO indicates that two 
developments are ushering in a new governance concept: framework creation 
and horizontalisation. Framework creation means that the government retreats 
to essential frameworks and from there actively, but focused on generalities, 
becomes involved with society. The government governs with several core 
rules, which on the one hand offer more scope to institutions, professionals and 
citizens but which are strictly monitored on the other hand. Horizontalisation 
means that institutions which have retained more freedom start to focus more 
on justification towards citizens and to be more oriented towards each other 
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than the government. Horizontalisation takes place within the frameworks set by 
the government (Korsten, A.F.A., 2004). In the cabinet vision 'new government' 
(BZK, 2003), the desire was expressed that modern government: 
- is more reserved in what it organises; 
- offers more scope to citizens and their organisations; 
- safeguards public interests and constitutional requirements;  
- delivers high quality results, in cases where the representation of public 
tasks cannot be designated to the market of the civil society, but must be 
performed by the government. 
 
 'Government' and 'governance' imply contrasting governance philosophies. 
'Government' refers here to the classic image of the government as the con-
trolling governing party which aims to weigh up and take decisions about the 
many interests (sometimes combined to form the general interest), to which 
the interest of its own organisation is generally subordinate. 'Governance' gives 
the image of a government as a party focused on dialogue and cooperation, 
the government as an actor among the other actors focused on a limited num-
ber of sub interests. Table 3.1 shows the main features of both governance 
philosophies.  
 
Table 3.1 Features of governance philosophies 
In terms of Government Governance 
Role of the state Only legitimate policy maker, 
stands for general interest, 
acts with one voice, as an umpire 
placed above individual interests. 
Sovereignty and autonomy are 
important 
Melting pot of interests within 
the wide force field of the state. 
The state is special, but it is 
heterogeneous and accom-
modates various interests. 
Sovereignty is an illusion 
Role of other actors In the optimal case, input is heard 
in advance 
May participate in implementation 
(if the government wants it) 
Are embraced in participation 
beforehand 
Must participate in implemen-
tation (in order to ensure its 
fruition)  
Governance Top-down; powerful 
Accountability 
Bottom-up; capacity,  
credibility  
Source: Based on Selnes and Van der Wielen (2008). 
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Table 3.1 Features of governance philosophies (continued) 
In terms of Government Governance 
Access to decision-
making 
Formal, ordered, hierarchy Informal, unordered, heterarchy 
Instruments Unilaterally imposed instruments 
whereby force is a possibility 
Voluntary instruments as cover 
Unilaterally imposed instruments 
only in extreme cases. Force is 
avoided  
Multilateral voluntary instruments 
are the essence 
Power and influence 'Power' 'Empowerment' 
Loyalty To authority and established 
government policy 
To relations and current social 
constructs 
Trust In democratic formula, politics, 
careful decision-making 
In capacities in the field, well 
organised policy processes 
Acceptance Via democratically chosen 
authorities 
Via conviction and persuasion as 
two-way traffic  
Legitimacy 
processes 
If they contribute to achieving 
government goals 
Are deemed essential 
Relationship goal 
and policy process 
Clear and indisputable, the policy 
process adapts to this 
Goals shift or disappear, process-
based approach  
Source: Based on Selnes and Van der Wielen (2008). 
 
 The above features do not always represent simple choices in which deci-
sion-makers are completely free. Moreover policy themes often contain ele-
ments of both governance perspectives. Within political literature, there is a 
debate about a supposed shift from government to governance. Governance is 
currently 'popular' but reality has shown that the tide can soon change: a gov-
ernment may 'let go' or 'govern at a distance', but at the very first crisis we call 
on the government. Private parties or independent services may predominate in 
practice, but it is often the Minister who is called to account in the Lower House. 
However, governments are under pressure to move towards governance rather 
than strong centralised control. To what extent the phytosanitary policy can 
be shaped according to the principles of governance depends, apart from the 
policy objective, the features of the organism and the environment, on the gov-
ernance concept and the governance style. In theory, this results in several 
possible governance models, such as:  
- self-governance; 
- network governance; 
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- transaction governance; 
- hierarchical governance. 
 
 In practice, those who wish to govern will choose from the different models 
(Selnes, 2001 and Baarsma, 2003) described below. 
 
Self-governance 
With self-governance, the government takes a reserved approach, but does set 
limiting conditions. Its role is more that of a stimulator, initiator, facilitator and 
guard. Free self-governance is common in the private sector, but can also be 
found in the following situation: with regard to the nature of the problem, gov-
ernment control is required, yet governance cannot be expected because the 
social problem is not regarded as public interest (the severity of the problem 
does not justify government control). In the case of free self-governance, parties 
control their own or each others' behaviour. A government may stimulate self-
governance processes or support initiatives with subsidies or amended legisla-
tion. Self-governance will then generally be an extension of network governance.  
 With regard to public interests, there is much more often a case of condi-
tioned self-governance: the government formulates the objective, while parties 
in the field try to achieve this objective through self-governance.  
 
Table 3.2  Self-governance 
Main features of 
self-governance 
- Consensus oriented 
- Objectives of the self-governing actors are an extension of the 
government objectives 
- Actors from the network have their own sources of help to achieve 
goals and are to some extent responsible for resolving the problem 
- Government is still ultimately responsible for the public interest 
Advantages  - The potential of businesses, organisations and citizens is called upon 
- More scope to act more effectively 
Disadvantages - Fundamental distinction between public and private sector can 
become more blurred 
- Providing the right form of monitoring is not always easy  
Associated policy 
instruments 
- Self-governing instruments: informative, behaviour-oriented, 
technology-oriented, contractual, dispute settlement 
Source: Own editing of various research projects (B. Baarsma, M. Haijer, J.A.M. Hufen, J. Hinssen, A.F.A. Korsten, 
T.A. Selnes). 
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Network governance 
With network governance, a government is an actor in interaction with other ac-
tors aimed at reaching consensus. A government actor which applies network 
governance assumes that more insight into alternatives and the consequences 
of alternatives will influence the behavioural choices of actors in the desired di-
rection. 
 
Table 3.3 Network governance 
Main features of 
self-governance 
- Mutual dependence between actors 
- Interactive processes between actors are characterised by a 
complexity and interwoven goals 
- Relationship patters between actors have a sustainable character 
Advantages  - Parties are often dependent on each other and the network approach 
offers a possible solution for this  
- Joint solution enjoys support among the parties 
- Use of the innovative and creative capacity of the actors  
Disadvantages - The autonomous and relatively closed position of policy networks 
asks questions of the democratic substance of decisions taken 
- Government only has limited capacity to provide governance to policy 
networks 
- Progress must be facilitated, to prevent endless consensus 
discussions  
Associated policy 
instruments 
- Second and third generation of multi-sided policy instruments (see 
below for further explanation) 
Source: Own editing of various research projects (B. Baarsma, M. Haijer, J.A.M. Hufen, J. Hinssen, A.F.A. Korsten, 
T.A. Selnes). 
 
Transaction governance 
With transaction governance, a government actor adopts an active approach in 
its interaction with the actors. A government actor which applies transaction 
governance assumes that actors are targeting their own interests and that the 
behavioural choices desired by the government actor are made more attractive 
through financial incentives and market-oriented contracts than the undesired al-
ternatives, so actors therefore adapt their behaviour.  
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Table 3.4 Transaction governance 
Main features of 
self-governance 
- Some degree of solidarity between the parties 
- Dependencies between actors 
- Government stands above the parties, because it imposes 
Advantages  - Parties in the field are listened to about the use of the policy 
instrument 
- Custom work is possible 
Disadvantages - The financial reward or levy for the behaviour is the incentive but not 
the inner conviction that it is right to act this way 
Associated policy 
instruments 
- Subsidies and levies 
Source: Own editing of various research projects (B. Baarsma, M. Haijer, J.A.M. Hufen, J. Hinssen, A.F.A. Korsten, 
T.A. Selnes). 
 
Hierarchical governance 
With hierarchical governance, a government actor imposes its own ideas on 
other actors. A government actor which applies hierarchical governance 
assumes that actors will largely comply with rules and regulations from a sense 
of standards. Hierarchical governance is mainly useful in cases where the 
government is relatively powerful and where there is no consensus between the 
different parties about the goals to be met. Another important consideration is 
that the government can protect certain weak groups by 'imposing' governance. 
In other forms of governance (particularly self-governance and network 
governance), the government assumes that the actors are capable of asserting 
themselves fairly well.  
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Table 3.5 Hierarchical governance 
Main features of 
self-governance 
- Government is above the parties; top down approach 
- Governing party is independent 
- The final goal is clear and fixed 
Advantages  - Democratic 
- Leading principles are legal certainty, justice and caution  
- Predictable  
Disadvantages - Possible information backlog of the government towards actors to be 
governed 
- Creative and innovative capacity of actors in the field is insufficiently 
exploited 
- In general, high enforcement burden 
Associated policy 
instruments 
- Legislation and regulations (whip) 
- Financial instruments (carrot) 
- Communicative instruments (sermon) 
Source: Own editing of various research projects (B. Baarsma, M. Haijer, J.A.M. Hufen, J. Hinssen, A.F.A. Korsten, 
T.A. Selnes). 
 
 A similar approach to governance philosophies can be found in the work of 
Professor C.J.A.M. Termeer with the discussion of three generations of policy 
instruments (lecture entitled Third Generation Governance, during the Dies 
Natalis of Wageningen University, 2008). Clear parallels can be drawn between 
the contradictions 'government versus governance' and the first, second and 
third generation policy instruments. In general, the more dynamic the potentially 
changeable variables in the field, the more a higher generation of policy instru-
ments will prove their effectiveness. There is no question of replacing one gen-
eration of policy instruments by another, whereby the third generation is the 
policy instrumentarium of the highest order. However, the increase in the atten-
tion for government failure has stimulated the need for a new generation of 
policy instruments. A brief discussion of the generations of policy instruments is 
included in Appendix 1.  
 
 
3.4 Policy instruments 
 
Policy instruments typically fit into a governance model. In this paragraph, we 
will briefly discuss the instruments relating to the different governance models 
from paragraph 3.3. This research assumes 5 types of instrument: Regulations 
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(behavioural rules and agreements) financial instruments, communicative instru-
ments, organisational and physical provisions. In Appendix 2, these instruments 
are briefly explained. It is important that the same types of instruments fit with 
different governance models. However, the form or the way in which the instru-
ment was created will vary. With regard to form or process, instruments can be 
unilateral or multilateral. With regard to the process, unilateral instruments are 
designed by one actor, while multilateral instruments are the result of a consul-
tation and negotiation process (Heuvelhof, 1997). To clarify: a covenant is in 
the form of a multilateral instrument, but can be unilateral in the process if one 
party in the process has exercised his power. By contrast, a subsidy is unilat-
eral in form, but can be extensively discussed with the target group in the crea-
tion process. 
 
Self-governance 
Many instruments which fit into network governance can also be used in self-
governance. Regulation via codes of conduct, protocols, covenants or commu-
nicative and organisational instruments like quality marks, chain guarantee 
system, recognition regulations fit in well with self-governance. With regard to 
conditioned self-governance, there are instruments which make it possible for 
the government to monitor whether the self-governance will result in the goal 
being achieved. Indicators and justification systems, as well as monitoring, 
benchmarking and quality control are examples of this. The government can 
use financial incentives and legal support to stimulate and support the process 
leading to self-governance (Baarsma, 2003).  
 
Network governance 
Network governance involves the so-called 2nd and 3rd generation policy instru-
ments. They can be described as multilateral instruments because they are the 
result of consultation and negotiation involving various parties.  
 Contracts and covenants, as long as they are not imposed, are examples of 
legal instruments. Subsidies, any form of knowledge development and informa-
tion and instruments to promote transparency such as quality marks and certifi-
cation are examples of financial and communicative instruments which fit into 
network governance. It is possible that the instrument is unilateral in its appear-
ance, but that there have been extensive negotiations. Organisational instru-
ments such as the appointment of a taskforce, visits and mediation are other 
options. Interactive policy development, for example through citizen platforms 
or business panels, and giving scope to experiments also resemble 3rd genera-
tion policy instruments. 
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Transaction governance 
As described in paragraph 3.2, the financial incentive to control behaviour is key 
to this form of governance. Financial instruments, such as subsidies and vouch-
ers, are the instruments which fit here. Although it is ultimately the government 
which uses or imposes the instrument, the instrument is created in a multilateral 
way. This means that the government joins the parties in the field to discuss the 
'how' question and the instrument is created through negotiation. This is a great 
difference from the use of financial instruments under hierarchical governance, 
whereby the government is not dependent on others or the behaviour of others. 
Actors may choose to use a subsidy, but they cannot choose whether to pay tax 
or not. 
 
Hierarchical governance 
The classic or first generation of instruments reflect the characteristics of a 
hierarchical, vertical structure. With hierarchical governance, the instruments 
are unilateral, i.e. designed and used by one actor, in this case the government. 
As such, both the form of the instrument and the creation process of the in-
strument are determined by one party. Legislation and regulations (whip) and 
various financial instruments (carrot) and communicative instruments (sermon) 
are among the instruments which fit into hierarchical governance.  
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4 Contours of a framework 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the policy framework is developed. Based on this framework, 
the government can elaborate its phytosanitary role in order to fulfil its ambi-
tions and goals. In the policy framework, the governance philosophy is applied 
as described in the limiting conditions in paragraph 1.3: privately where possi-
ble, publicly where necessary and individually where possible, collectively where 
necessary. In other words, a government which establishes a framework which 
leaves as much scope as possible for social parties.  
 The policy framework is shaped in such a way that, based on characteristics 
of organisms, market parties and their governance style, policy makers can 
determine which governance model is suitable for preventing market failure or 
to compensate the consequences of market failure. In this chapter, the policy 
framework will firstly be set in a theoretical context. In paragraph 4.3, the 
framework will be applied to the phytosanitary policy. Finally, attention will be 
devoted on the distribution of the costs between government and private 
parties. In order to gain a better sense of the motivation for government to 
intervene and the working of the policy framework, a case is elaborated in 
Appendix 3.  
 
 
4.2 Theoretical context 
 
Criterion 
With a positive answer to the question whether government policy is necessary, 
a criterion is required as a basis to assess which government interventions are 
most desirable. A generally accepted criterion is the welfare criterion: the sum 
of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus. One of the great disadvan-
tages of this method is that intangible needs are not involved in this method; 
besides consumers, people are also citizens, employees, et cetera. In Chap-
ter 3, we stated that welfare involves all needs (tangible and intangible) which 
put pressure on scarce resources. Theoretically, the criterion could therefore 
be the maximisation of the difference between the increased welfare as a result 
of the government intervention (targeted effects and external effects) minus 
the costs of this intervention. Because this also involves intangible needs and 
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goods, it is not easy to quantify the increased welfare. For this reason, the in-
crease and decline of welfare will be indicated in qualitative terms. 
 
Iterative process 
The phytosanitary policy framework means that the government defines phyto-
sanitary goals and determines what role it wishes to play therein. Defining the 
phytosanitary goals is an iterative process. Starting points in the framework are 
the phytosanitary problem on the one hand and the governance philosophy on 
the other. On this basis, the government identifies goals, establishes instru-
ments, evaluates the outcomes and reviews the goals, after which the policy is 
adjusted if necessary. The policy framework thus fits in with standard policy 
evaluation procedures.  
 The following steps are identified (see Figure 4.1): 
1. Define the welfare loss that occurs as a result of the market failure in quali-
tative and if possible quantitative terms based on the social effects; 
2. Determine the current governance philosophy that the government wishes to 
use to resolve the problem; 
3. Formulate the goal. The goal comes from the problem to be resolved (reduc-
tion of the welfare loss as a result of market failure) and from the govern-
ance philosophy. This step focuses among others on the question whether 
the government wishes to accept the obligation to act or achieve results; 
4. Make a further analysis of the problem based on the characteristics of the 
organism and actors, so that a governance model can be chosen; 
5. Based on step 4, determine which instruments should logically be used; 
6. Draw up the targeted benefits (increased welfare level) and the expected 
costs resulting from the government interventions in qualitative and if pos-
sible quantitative terms. Specify these benefits according to subgroup, for 
example producer, consumer, citizen/taxpayer, et cetera. The costs for the 
government and market parties are directly related to the intervention or are 
the result of government failure; 
7. Evaluate the policy effectively and efficiently and adapt the instruments, 
governance model and/or ambitions if necessary.  
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Figure 4.1  Policy framework diagram 
 
 
 Through this framework, substance is given to the limiting conditions as de-
scribed in paragraph 1.3. By starting from the governance approach, creation 
of support among stakeholders is inherent to the chosen strategy. Because the 
government wishes to be an actor among other social actors, regulation is less 
obvious. However, it is then the question whether the government is able to 
achieve the goals to be formulated: the effectiveness question. The decisive 
factor here is how the goals are formulated: the creation of limiting conditions 
corresponds with an obligation to act, to achieve an increase in welfare with an 
obligation to achieve results. When the second is the case, there is the risk that 
the governance approach is not effective enough. The government will then 
have to take more control. However, the risk of higher costs for the implemen-
tation and unintended side effects increases too, whereby the efficiency of the 
policy can decline. The government will be willing to incur costs as long as the 
'yield' is higher than the costs and theoretically searches for a point where extra 
costs are the same the extra yield which is the result (where the marginal costs 
linked to government effort are the same as the marginal welfare profit which 
that produces).  
 
 
3.  Goal:  
compensate welfare loss with 
minimum government intervention 
2.  Governance philosophy:  
governance  
4.  Analyse interests and 
measures:  
choose governance model 
7.  Determine 
effectiveness 
and efficiency 
5.  Determine 
instruments 
6.  Determine the 
costs and benefits 
1. Problem:  
nature of the market failure 
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4.3 Application of the policy framework 
 
1. Define problem 
The problem definition starts once a new disease or infestation threatens or 
arrives in the country or has been present for some time and is now starting 
to become serious. If not enough is known about the organism, information 
will be collected and analysed in order to chart the risk of the organism.1 
The results are communicated to the business community. Communicating 
the risks helps prevent information asymmetry, but does not abolish it. 
The actual information asymmetry relates to the knowledge of the contract 
parties about the fact that the product is contaminated, not to the fact that 
there is a risk. Through communication, the chain parties are aware of the 
risks associated with plant-based material and take it into account in the 
contract. When sufficient information is available, it can be assessed 
whether negative external effects will occur. If that is not the case, govern-
ment intervention will not be necessary as there is no question of market 
failure. If the external effects only occur within the sector and there are no 
unintended effects on the welfare of third parties, the government may 
decide not to intervene, but that is up to the sector to decide. When there 
are unacceptable external effects for third parties, government intervention 
is necessary. The social debate ultimately determines whether external 
effects are regarded as unacceptable or not. The problem analysis is shown 
in Figure 4.2. 
 
                                                 
1 We have consciously chosen to avoid the term PRA (Pest Risk Analysis) in order to stay as close to 
the assumption as possible that there is no phyosanitary policy.  
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Figure 4.2  Elaboration first step: establishing the problem 
 
 
  
Is enough known about 
the organism? 
Carry out information and 
risk analysis and 
communicate results 
Are there any external 
effects? 
Yes 
Government intervention 
not necessary 
No 
Yes 
 
Are certain threshold 
values exceeded? 
No 
Proceed to the next step 
Yes 
 
No 
 39 
 Possible welfare losses as a result of information asymmetry or external 
effects are:  
- Reduction of competitive power 
- For the producer 
the arrival of a new disease and infestation can damage food products, 
ornamental products or the raw material, resulting in reduction of the 
production and trade. Growers may be able to counter this by using pes-
ticides, et cetera. This increases the production costs for the producer 
as well as leading to negative external effects in the form of harm to the 
environment. Other relevant negative external effects relate to the com-
petitive power of the sector as a whole and even the Dutch economy. 
- For the sector1 
increased risk of spreading new diseases and infestations could lead to 
preventative spraying to prevent contamination, resulting in production 
cost increase and harm to the environment. Increased production costs 
and possibly declining interest of foreign buyers due to incorrect expec-
tations of quality loss and/or damaged image leads to loss of the com-
petitive power and export position of the sector.  
- For the Netherlands 
due to the importance of plant-based production and trade for the Dutch 
economy and employment, the result of the Dutch economy may be 
considerable. A good competitive position and sufficient employment are 
not only important for the plant sector but also for the Dutch government 
as the representative of Dutch general interests.  
- Food certainty and safety 
A possible consequence of the diseases and infestations is reduction of food 
production in the Netherlands. This will not immediately constitute a danger 
for food certainty for the Netherlands (and the rest of the world). This will  
only be the case when such problems occur in a large number of third coun-
tries. A possible consequence of the extra use of pesticides, there is an in-
creased risk of residue forming on the food. In principle, legislation for crop 
protection prevents this negative external effect. 
- Nature and landscape 
the arrival of a plant disease or infestation can have major consequences for 
that attractiveness of the landscape and the immediate living environment, 
                                                 
1 In the rest of this study, sector does not refer to the whole plant production but to sub sectors, 
such as arable farming, greenhouse horticulture and tree cultivation.  
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when certain species characteristic for the landscape disappear or the 
amount of green declines. 
- Biodiversity 
biodiversity is threatened if species (as part of an ecosystem) disappear of 
which there is a vulnerable population in the Netherlands (red list species).  
- Environment 
Tackling diseases and infestations with chemicals damages the environment 
through the emission of harmful substances to the soil, water, air. In princi-
ple, legislation for crop protection prevents this negative external effect. 
 
 Application of the policy framework as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 means 
that the government intervention may be required as early as step 1 in order to 
define the problem. At the same time, government intervention does not need 
to mean that the government does the work itself. In the implementation, the 
government also has the freedom to decide what it does itself and what it has 
done by market parties (see paragraph 3.3). 
 
2. Determine current governance philosophy 
As described in Chapter 3, in the government there is a visible shift in gov-
ernance approach from government to governance. In this research too, 
on behalf of the client the governance approach is leading.  
 
3. Formulate the goal and governance concept 
Government intervention is aimed at totally or partially resolving the problem. 
The aim can vary from minimising the welfare loss to creating limiting con-
ditions within which market parties can reduce the welfare loss as elabo-
rated in step 1. As with the governance philosophy, the governance concept 
for the phytosanitary policy field was also more or less provided by the 
client. It means that responsibility is taken as far as possible by the market 
parties themselves. The business community will arrange its institutional 
organisation from its own interest (economically healthy competitive sector) 
in such a way that it can bear its responsibility in order to tackle phyto-
sanitary threats. As an actor among the other actors, the government (the 
Ministry of EL&I) will preferably want to contribute to the formation of these 
institutions and where necessary close essential holes in the system in order 
to fulfil its role as guardian/producer of the public goods and to continue to 
strive for maximisation of welfare. This demands choices, because phyto-
sanitary ambitions can affect other policy areas and ambitions may be con-
flicting. The 'solution' depends on the result of the social and political 
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debate. Is a certain degree of environmental pollution accepted in order to 
maintain competitive power, for example? These ambitions are expressed in 
the cabinet's various policy documents.  
 
4. Analyse problem and determine governance model  
It is important to remember that governance philosophy, governance con-
cept and governance instruments apply for the entire policy field of plant 
health, but that within these frameworks different governance models (mix of 
governance philosophy, concept and instruments) can be used, depending 
on the characteristics of organisms and actors in the field. In order to com-
pose the ideal model, the government needs answers to the following three 
questions:  
1. know 
Do the market parties have the relevant information to be able to make 
responsible choices? 
2.  want 
Does minimising the phytosanitary risk serve the interests of responsible 
market parties? 
3.  can 
Are market parties capable of taking measures to tackle the phytosani-
tary risk? 
 
 The first question focuses on preventing market failure as a result of infor-
mation asymmetry. The second question involves preventing and compensating 
market failure as a result of negative external effects. The third question relates 
to the possibilities of private parties to intervene. 
 The question 'know' was answered in step 1, in which it was indicated that, 
due to lack of information, an information and risk analysis is carried out and the 
results must be communicated. This step relates to the questions 'want' and 
'can'.  
 
Want 
In order to answer the question 'Does minimising the phytosanitary risk serve 
the interests of responsible market parties?' we need to consider what interests 
and positions social actors have. It must also be investigated whether and to 
what extent they experience incentives to prevent negative external effects. Fig-
ure 4.3 contributes to answering these questions by studying step by step to 
what degree private and public interests correspond and which economic incen-
tives are experienced.  
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 In this part of the policy framework, possibilities are sought to prevent or 
compensate negative external effects. This prevention or compensation can be 
done at business level, sector and sub-sector level or at the level of the plant 
sector and requires an economic incentive. Such an incentive is present if pri-
vate interests are at stake. If the private interests partially or wholly correspond 
with public interests, the public interests are partially or wholly served through 
measures by the private parties which wish to prevent or compensate the nega-
tive external effects in their own interests. If there are no corresponding inter-
ests, then hierarchical governance is required by the government to safeguard 
the public interests. Figure 4.3 looks at this mechanism in more detail.  
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Figure 4.3  Diagram to derive governance model 
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Public and private interests (needs) 
The external effects resulting from the production of and trade in plant-based 
products are described as potentially unintended negative effects on satisfying 
needs (welfare) of others: need for nature, nice landscape, biodiversity, clean 
environment, safe food and a healthy economy (sufficient competitive power). If 
the private interest does not correspond with the public interest, there is no 
economic mechanism to stimulate producers and traders to take their respon-
sibility. That means (production of the 'goods') minimising the phytosanitary 
risks and creating protection against the risks of contamination. Because these 
'goods' behave as public goods. Although lobby groups can manifest them-
selves like nature conservation organisations, without a role for the government 
they are unable to satisfactorily issue effective incentives. Government interven-
tion is required to ensure that producers and traders bear their responsibility.  
 If the private interest corresponds with the public interest, then the public in-
terest can be helped by the measures taken by the businesses in the sector to 
prevent contamination. In other words: there is an economic incentive for trad-
ers and producers to produce the previously public 'good' creation of protection 
against the risks of contamination. The government can then play a more low-
key role. However, it is possible that the public interest benefits insufficiently 
from the private measures or that other public interests are involved (for exam-
ple preventative spraying versus environmental harm). In such cases, the gov-
ernment will have to be more active and at least draw up limiting conditions for 
the sector.  
 
Individual and collective interests (within the sector)  
External effects can also occur within the plant-based sector. If an economic in-
centive is present, the individual entrepreneur will take the responsibility and cre-
ate protection against the risks. This incentive is present when the individual 
entrepreneur is liable for the phytosanitary quality of the products he produces 
or in which he trades. That is the case when phytosanitary risks can be traced 
to his individual businesses and behaviour. If that is not the case, the sector will 
collectively arm itself and take measures to guarantee that clean products are 
delivered. Within the sector, these measures have the character of public good: 
everyone benefits from the effects (non-rival and non-excludable), with the risk 
of free-riding. However, this market failure does not need to be offset by the 
government. It can be left to the sector organisations, which have different re-
sources at their disposal, such as certification, social pressure, selective incen-
tives (focusing on their own interest) for participation in the collective goal. The 
fact that the government leaves resolving of the market failure to the sector   
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does not mean that it has no intention or will to intervene. A strongly competitive 
sector is also important to the government and furthermore there can some-
times be too many opposing interests within one sector (for example importers 
and producers), making it difficult for the sector to act as a collective. By play-
ing a stimulating or facilitating role, whether or not at the request of the sector, 
the government can make a contribution. 
 Figure 4.3 shows that four governance models may be relevant to govern-
ment intervention with regard to harmful organisms. Obviously, this is a simple 
sketch of the reality and serves as an aid. In reality, each model has its own 
composition of governance and instruments and this composition will constantly 
be subject to change. For example: depending on how the process proceeds, 
network governance can change into self-governance, but also into hierarchical 
governance. 
 
Elaboration of the models 
a. Conditioned and free Self-governance 
Organisms pose a threat at least to the interests of the chain parties. Busi-
nesses benefit themselves from fighting or eliminating the disease or infes-
tation and have adequate possibilities to do so. In this case, the answers to 
the questions know, want and can are three times yes, thus fulfilling the con-
ditions for self-governance. One example is Tuta absoluta (South American 
Tomato Leaf Miner) in the Netherlands. The interests outside the agro chain 
are served by the measures of the businesses and the sector. The govern-
ment desires a guarantee from the sector and will set goals which the sec-
tor is accountable for. This is conditioned self-governance. The government 
continues to be responsible for the public interests. 
b. Network governance 
Organisms pose a threat at least to public interests and could damage the 
interests of chain parties.  
- Only public interests: businesses and sectors in the agro chain are not 
encouraged to combat or tackle the problem. The government is willing 
to actively govern, but is dependent on the sector for achieving its goals 
and is faced with several actors in the field. These include weeds and 
water plants which are distributed through consumers of garden centres 
unintentionally in the free nature, but cause great damage there. An ex-
ample of this is the floating pennywort infestation which caused havoc in 
the Netherlands.  
  
46 
- Corresponding private and public interests. Both government and indus-
try have interests in tackling the problem and depend on each other for 
its effectiveness. An example of this is Phytophthora ramorum.  
c. Hierarchical governance 
This category includes organisms in which there are virtually only interests 
outside the agrochain at stake. The chain will want to keep its costs as low 
as possible and will not therefore be tempted to take measures. Hierarchical 
governance will get businesses and the sector to behave in a way that is in 
conflict with their individual interest (low costs). This may be the case with 
regard to weeds which are easy to combat on farms and agricultural hold-
ings, but not in nature where they pose a threat to biodiversity. An example 
is Impatiens glandulifera. In view of the governance philosophy, before hier-
archical governance is chosen, the possibility for network governance will 
first be explored.  
d. Transaction governance 
This form involves governance through financial instruments. Its application 
in the phytosanitary policy is not relevant, and we will not therefore consider 
it further.  
 
Ability 
The phytosanitary system may be designed so that the private parties, whether 
individually or collectively, are stimulated to minimise the phytosanitary risk in 
their own interest, but they are not technically capable of doing it. In that case it 
is about 'ability'. If this condition is not met, the negative external effects occur 
and a government role is still relevant. This becomes clear in Figure 4.4. In or-
der to answer the question whether market parties are able to take measures 
with which the phytosanitary risk can be combated, the following aspects are 
important: 
- recognisability of the organism and symptoms;  
- availability of detection methods to demonstrate the presence of the organ-
ism; 
- availability of effective measures. 
 
 Efforts are being made to develop methods which reveal and combat risks 
for plant health on farms. If that is not possible, methods at sector level will 
have to be developed for that purpose. If that too proves impossible, the gov-
ernment will have to assume the task. That is the case for pathogens whose 
symptoms cannot be recognised on the treated products and/or cannot be 
combated. Examples are PSTVd and Meloidogyne chitwoodi.  
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Are businesses able to take 
measures (symptoms recognisable, 
measures available) 
Businesses take measures 
Are sectors able to take measures? 
(symptoms recognisable, measures 
available) 
Sectors take measures 
Government takes measures 
No 
No 
Yes  
Yes 
Figure 4.4  Diagram to determine who takes measures 
 
 
 
5. Determine instruments 
Step 4 goes into more detail about the 'routes' which could be followed to 
choose the most appropriate governance model. Chapter 3 indicated which 
policy instruments fit the various governance models. It was also indicated 
that policy instruments can be used in several governance models. In this 
step, we look at which instruments can be used for which phytosanitary 
problem. Here, the governance model does not so much determine the 
choice of instruments, but the route to choosing them. The questions deter-
mine the nature of the problem to be solved and thus give direction to the 
instrument.  
 
a. Self-governance 
If only private interests are at stake, then the government will be more 
reserved and may only facilitate in the legal or financial atmosphere. For 
example, if the sector chooses standard regulations, the government 
must approve such a regulation. If the sector chooses informative in-
struments such as quality mark and certification, the government can 
stimulate this with a financial contribution.  
If besides private interests, public interests are at stake, the govern-
ment will have to play a more active role and in addition to limiting condi-
tions also provide the sector with accountable goals. The government 
will then have to use monitoring and other instruments and justification 
methods to check whether the goals are being achieved.  
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b. Network governance 
It is possible that for certain harmful organisms, there is insufficient 
knowledge about the recognisability of the symptoms. Or there may not 
be a good detection method available to trace the organism at farm lev-
el. In order to reduce the risks of contamination and possibly to prevent 
free rider behaviour, other measures are necessary. In that case, the 
sector can request the government to offer the sector scope (for exam-
ple through the commodity boards or semi-public bodies) to impose ur-
gent measures on the entrepreneurs and to monitor compliance. The 
sector can also create a quality mark or certificate to stimulate busi-
nesses to take measures and thus reduce the risk. Finally, by setting up 
a damage fund or insurance, compensation for any damage can be 
made if the residual risk does manifest itself. Within insurance, premium 
differentiation linked to participation in a certification system can act as a 
positive incentive to improve an entrepreneur's behaviour. In the case of 
a damage fund, this incentive can be built in at collective level; only certi-
fied businesses can apply for compensation from the damage fund. If 
businesses and the sector have taken their measures, but the risk re-
mains, import inspections may be imposed as a measure. The govern-
ment will then need to set legal frameworks. Also in the case that the 
organism does establish itself, legal frameworks may be necessary to 
enable its elimination.  
 
 Sometimes the interests of government and business may partially agree 
and partially conflict with each other. These are often complex policy issues with 
several actors such as the representatives of the sector and various representa-
tives in the field of nature, environment, food safety. The government will have 
the tendency to deploy multilateral instruments aimed at reaching a consensus. 
In such cases, the government may agree a covenant with the sector, for exam-
ple, in which the measures and goals can be aligned. Organisational instruments 
such as the Executive Council of Taskforce can be used.  
 The government can decide to offer research and information exchange as 
a collective provision, although in theory research can be provided privately. 
However, private research often involves excessive transaction costs, while 
delivery by the government stimulates the positive external effects of research. 
Examples of such research are risk analysis in the case of new diseases and 
infestations, and research into detection methods to reveal invisible contamina-
tion. Also for the role of lobbyist in an international context, the government 
chooses to fulfil this role. On the one hand due to public interests (although 
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these may be the same as the private interests), but on the other hand also be-
cause it is often more efficient and more effective to operate internationally as a 
member state than as an individual business or sector. 
 
c. Hierarchical governance 
Drawing up legislation and regulations, imposing levies or granting sub-
sidies without extensive input from the actors in the field are obvious in-
struments. The possible disadvantage of this form of governance is 
compliance (or lack of compliance) with the rules, whereby the costs of 
enforcing them can be considerable. A possible advantage is that, due 
to lack of consensus between the actors in the field, the government de-
cides and fulfils its role as representative of the general interest or pro-
tector of the weaker parties. 
 
6. Determine the costs and benefits resulting from government intervention 
In this phase, the 'benefits' of the government interventions are investigated. 
These benefits involve the degree in which the welfare loss resulting from 
the market failure is reduced and any positive external effects of the govern-
ment intervention. The costs consist of all the government's efforts in terms 
of time and money to reduce the welfare loss and any negative external ef-
fects of the government interventions (government failure).  
 
7. Determine effectiveness and efficiency 
In this last step, the degree to which reducing welfare loss causes by the 
use of instruments is assessed. The effectiveness reflects the extent to 
which individual instruments contribute to the result. The efficiency indicates 
the effect of the relationship of the costs and benefits of using the instru-
ments. It is assessed whether the ambitions are achieved, whether this oc-
curs efficiently and whether adjustment of the policy is required. When 
considering amendments, it is first checked whether amendment in the in-
struments is possible, then in the governance model and once the possibili-
ties here have been exhausted too, a review of the ambitions is essential.  
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4.4 Distributing the costs 
 
With regard to the choice of instruments, no decision has been taken about the 
distribution of the costs resulting from implementing the policy. In this para-
graph, we explore the options. 
 The report Markt toegang [Market access] (Breukers and Bunte, 2007) de-
scribes an assessment framework for prioritising and distributing the costs of 
phytosanitary calamities in the export of Dutch products. For the cost distribu-
tion which the government can use to promote market access, three criteria are 
developed: 
1. government interest 
The interest of the government (as an organisation, not to be confused with 
public interest) can lie in political desirability, the wish to gather phytosani-
tary information or to invest in phytosanitary relations. 
2. public character 
Market access is a public good: characteristics are non-exclusive and non-
rival. However, it is not a pure public good, because only exporters of plants 
and plant-based products use this good. The extent of its public character 
depends on: 
a. number of interested parties; 
b. ability to identify interested parties; 
c. possibility to create exclusivity. 
3. profit - cost relationship 
Interested parties can contribute to the costs according to the extent of the 
profit they enjoy: the theory of profit. The principle of equality also applies 
here: for each profit enjoyed from the service offered, each individual must 
pay the same price. 
 
 These criteria cannot be applied in this way in the policy framework. The 
starting point that there is no phytosanitary policy is not compatible with 
claiming government interest as an argument. However, the public character 
and the profit - cost relationship are compatible. Furthermore, the extent to 
which the benefits serve the previously mentioned five social goals could be 
examined.  
 Another approach not described in the report referred to above, but which is 
relevant to this study, is the principle 'the polluter pays'. Here one should not 
look at the consequences but the causes. Because phytosanitary risks are 
largely caused by international trade, when applying this principle, it would seem 
obvious to place the costs of measures and responsibility for damage with the 
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producers and/or traders (who then incorporated this in the price of the prod-
ucts to the buying party, which then et cetera …). This means that the per-
petrator is held responsible for the damage he causes. Liability can only be 
implemented when:  
1. Contamination with an organism can be demonstrably traced to the perpe-
trator; 
2. The perpetrator has demonstratively failed to act appropriately. In practice, 
this is an impossible path to take.  
 
 Although new detection methods are increasing the options to trace harmful 
organisms, it is difficult and time-consuming to prove blameworthy behaviour. 
Reversing the burden of proof regarding imputability could boost the incentive 
to reduce phytosanitary risks. This will benefit the effectiveness of the policy to 
reduce risks.  
 In the United Kingdom, a study was recently conducted into the relationship 
between responsibility and possibilities for cost sharing between government 
and industry (Waage et al., 2007). This report recommends sharing the costs 
between government and industry based on the public and private relationship 
of effects. Ex ante evaluations into the possibilities for risk reduction (effective-
ness and efficiency) can be used to set priorities. For this purpose, agreements 
between government and industry are entered into about: 
- the sources and nature of the risks for plant health; 
- the planned approach to assess, reduce and manage the risk; 
- the cost sharing between government and private parties; 
- the method of cooperation and taking responsibility; 
- compliance terms. 
 
 The study refers to a similar system now operating in Australia, where vari-
ous covenants between government and agricultural sectors exist. These cove-
nants contain agreements about the approach to risks for plant health and cost 
distribution. Interestingly, the profit principle is applied here rather than 'the pol-
luter pays'.  
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5 Back to reality 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The policy framework as developed in Chapter 4 assumes the absence of phyto-
sanitary policy. In order to be able to use this framework, it will have to be con-
sistent with international phytosanitary frameworks. Where it is not consistent, 
the government may consider trying to create scope in international regulations. 
In this chapter, the developed framework is compared with the International 
Plant Protection Convention and the European Phytosanitary Directive (detailed 
description of the convention and the directive in Appendix 4). 
 
 
5.2 International Plant Protection Convention and EU Phytosanitary  
 Directive 
 
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) was created under the re-
sponsibility of the FAO. It establishes frameworks for all actions to be performed 
by the member states to keep the plant-based production systems and the nat-
ural environment free from invasive plant diseases and infestations. The IPPC 
formulates guidelines for the administration, certification and requirements for 
imports, which must not contradict WTO policy. In Europe, these guidelines are 
elaborated in the Phytosanitary Directive 2000/29/EC.  
 
 
5.3 Comparison 
 
In principle, the policy framework does not conflict with the IPPC or the Phyto-
sanitary Directive. It can be regarded as a supplement to existing legal instru-
ments. The policy framework provides opportunities to adapt other legal 
instruments too. 
 The measures established in the IPPC and the Phytosanitary Directive as-
sume a government which acts unilaterally and imposes measures. The Phyto-
sanitary Directive is an example of legislation and regulations and that fits into 
hierarchical governance. Placing organisms under the regime of the Phyto-
sanitary Directive implies allocation of the quarantine status. Member states 
are then obliged to adapt a number of measures. From the application of 
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Figure 4.3, for certain organisms it can be derived from the framework that 
hierarchical governance is the most appropriate with assignment of the q-status. 
However, other outcomes are also possible. The Phytosanitary Directive does 
not address the possibility of using the motivation of interested parties for re-
ducing phytosanitary risks (economic incentive). Consequently there is the risk 
that too many organisms are given q-status. The policy framework differentiates 
according to characteristics of organisms and interests of stakeholders and 
through the introduction of governance models offers a richer pallet of possibil-
ities for managing phytosanitary risks. This requires member states to be given 
more freedom to use the policy framework besides the usual pest risk analysis 
when determining their position regarding the q rating of a plant disease or in-
festation. The framework gains in strength when it is internationally accepted as 
a legitimate assessment framework. The additional application of the policy 
framework can hinder the automatic assignment of the q-status and give cause 
to review the existing q-status of a number of organisms on the A1 and A2 list.  
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6 Discussion, conclusions and 
recommendations 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter starts with a description of Phytopia, i.e. the desired future picture 
of phytosanitary policy. This is followed by some thoughts regarding the study. 
The conclusions are described in paragraph 6.3. The chapter finishes with rec-
ommendations about how to achieve the outlined future picture.  
 
 
6.2 Discussion 
 
Future of Phytopia 
The framework described in this report needs to be translated in a coherent pic-
ture about the ideal way to shape plant health policy: 
1. The traditional distinction between quality diseases and quarantine diseases 
disappears in the sense that more intermediate forms emerge. The uncondi-
tional quarantine status is restricted to diseases and infestations whereby it 
is impossible to stimulate the responsible social actors to take effective 
measures (and hierarchical governance is then necessary) or that taking ef-
fective measures is technically impossible. Where public interests are at 
stake and effective measures against the organisms are possible by private 
parties, the organism could be given a conditional non-quarantine status. The 
condition is then that the parties actually take the effective measures. If this 
does not happen, the organism will be given a quarantine status. More vari-
ants are possible here. Abandoning the traditional distinction generates 
more focus on the really risky organisms.  
2. In order to stimulate private parties to take their responsibility, the principle 
'the polluter pays' must be applied. At the same time, the liability will have to 
be arranged in such a way that the proof of imputability is placed with the 
party responsible for the risk. A 'tracking and tracing' system for products 
would be useful here.  
3. Private parties organise the phytosanitary system in such a way that the 
phytosanitary quality is optimally safeguarded and transparent. This can be 
achieved through certification.  
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4. The remaining phytosanitary risks can be covered by means of a fund or in-
surance, whereby certification can influence participation in the fund or level 
of the premium.  
 
International framework 
The Netherlands has a strong agricultural export position and is thus one of a 
limited number of countries with a strong agricultural export position. There are 
many more countries which are a net importer. The interests of both groups 
vary. The current development of abolishing tariff barriers creates the risk that 
importing countries will start to use non-tariff barriers to falsely protect their own 
production. Phytosanitary requirements can be abused in this respect. Importing 
countries will be therefore not quick to liberalise phytosanitary policy. The inter-
national dissemination of the research results therefore requires a careful strat-
egy and the necessary diplomacy in order not to disrupt trade relations. 
 
Sustainability 
The starting point in the development of a policy framework that there is no 
phytosanitary policy also implies the lack of distinction between invasive and 
endemic plant diseases and infestations. The consequence is that the frame-
work also extends to endemic plant diseases and infestation. This is the policy 
domain of crop protection. It is important to distinguish between these policy 
domains. The phytosanitary policy focuses on the consequences of the dis-
eases and infestations themselves. The crop protection policy is primarily in-
volved with the consequences of the measures taken against plant diseases and 
infestations. Logically, the objectives of policy domains are an extension of each 
other. However, the current phytosanitary policy and crop protection policy do 
no resemble each other in the long term. The crop protection policy is aimed at 
an integrated approach to plant diseases and infestations with minimum impact 
on the environment. In practice, this means that the level of disease and infesta-
tion is brought back to an acceptable level. The phytosanitary policy is based on 
zero tolerances for diseases and infestations which much be targeted from a 
fixed framework. The lack of sufficient resources and measures to keep invasive 
disease and infestation at an acceptable level undoubtedly plays a major role. 
In the proposed framework, this comes together in the assessment of social 
actors who are capable of taking measures. The crop protection policy ensures 
that only those resources are used whose negative external effects of their use 
are socially acceptable. In the proposed framework, the availability of pesticides 
is a given.  
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 Ideally, the admission framework would be part of the policy framework, 
so that the external effects of the invasive diseases and the external effects of 
possible accepted and not accepted pesticides could be assessed at the same 
time. For this research, integration in one policy framework is too complex. 
In practice, policy makers of both policy domains can carry out this joint as-
sessment. 
 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
Based on this study, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
- The justification for the government to be actively involved in phytosanitary 
matters lies in the failure of the market mechanism in the market of plant-
based products. The market failure is the result of information asymmetry 
and external effects.  
- The degree of government involvement depends on: 
a. The availability of information about damage by a plant disease or infes-
tation, or the risk of this; 
b. The responsible economic actors who are stimulated to prevent and 
manage risks;  
c. The technical possibility of achieving effective measures.  
If entrepreneurs know, are willing and able, the role of the government can 
be limited and it can give industry more responsibility.  
- The incentives for actors who are responsible for phytosanitary risks can 
be boosted by applying the principle 'the polluter pays' and reversing the 
burden of proof so that the causer of the risk must prove that he has not 
acted importunely.  
 
 
6.4 Recommendations  
 
Based on this study, the following recommendations are made. 
- Apply the framework when determining an attitude towards the quarantine 
rating of new organisms.  
- Use diplomatic channels and discussions in international channels and 
discussion in international forums for acceptance of the framework 
developed in this study. Use it to review international regulations and 
treaties. 
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- Apply the framework when determining an attitude towards the roles of the 
government and industry.  
- Work together with industry and other social actors on the further develop-
ment of the instruments. Take into account knowledge development, a sys-
tem to track and trace products, certification, et cetera. 
- Look for examples of where the incentive for industry is already present for 
taking measures and learn from it. Example: in the  sector for seed and 
plant material, entrepreneurs are optimally motivated to deliver disease and 
infestation-free products. This motivation is not the result of existing 
legislation and regulations, but is generated out of self-interest. 
Contaminations can be traced, thus risking the generally close relationship 
with the customer. If the contamination becomes more widely known, the 
reputation of the business is at stake, irrevocably leading to market loss. 
This is something growers will always want to avoid.  
- Apply the principle 'the polluter pays' when claiming for the financial conse-
quences in the manifestation of risks for plant health. 
- Place responsibility for proving non-imputability with the responsible actors. 
- Develop a criterion for evaluating the consequences of applying the frame-
work described in this report on effectiveness and efficiency. 
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Appendix 1 
Generations of policy instruments 
 
 
In the report, various approaches to governance are described. We addressed 
the relationship between desired governance and the corresponding instru-
ments. In this paragraph, the difference between the various generations of pol-
icy instruments is explained. In general, the more dynamic the potentially 
changeable variables in the field, the better a higher generation of policy in-
struments will prove to be. The three generations of policy instruments as de-
scribed below are derived from the work of Professor C.J.A.M. Termeer (lecture 
entitled Third Generation Governance, during the Dies Natalis of Wageningen 
University, 2008). 
 
First generation policy instruments 
The principle assumption regarding the first generation policy instruments is 
that the government steers social developments through the use of policy in-
struments. Social problems can only be resolved if people change their behav-
iour, whether by the whip (legal instruments), the carrot (financial instruments) 
of the sermon (information instruments) (according to P. Winsemius).  
 
Second generation policy instruments 
Similarly, the principle assumption regarding the second generation policy in-
struments is also that the government steers social developments.  
 However, the instruments of the second generation: 
- Leave more scope for negotiation; 
- Provide more options to respond to a situation than policy instruments from 
the first generation; 
- Are usually part of a mix of policy instruments or are part of a political ar-
rangement; 
- Can also indirectly be focused on achieving the goal; 
- Can contain a threat of legislation if society does not tackle a certain theme 
itself;  
- May contain a policy strategy that is focused on changing the institutional 
context of the mutual dependencies in a network.  
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Third generation policy instruments 
Third generation policy instruments result from a more modest picture of gov-
ernment control. The starting point is a government which does not prescribe 
what behaviour is required of its citizens. It is also a government which does not 
believe that it can control behaviour by using smart instruments. The third gen-
eration policy instruments involve a more situational form of governance which 
fit into the current change processes in social and natural systems.  
 Third generation policy instruments demand that government actors have 
insight into a situation and are willing to use suitable policy instruments. This will 
mainly be the case in complex dynamic situations, as long as there is a willing-
ness and an opportunity for the actors in the field to adapt to the desired direc-
tion of the policy. Furthermore, the actors must be given room to experiment, 
develop and learn. If this is not possible, then application of the first or second 
generation policy instruments is inevitable. For less complicated situations, the 
first or second generation policy instruments are sufficient. 
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Appendix 2 
Policy instruments divided into category and according 
to applicability per control approach 
 
 
This research is based on five types of instruments: legal instruments, financial 
instruments, communicative instruments, organisational and physical facilities. 
Instruments which place activity at a distance (from government) and instru-
ments which can support self-governance are a separate category. 
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Legal instruments (regulations and agreements)     
Regulations: 
- Act 
- General Board measure 
- Policy rule 
 
* 
* 
* 
   
Permit system *    
Planning (code, protocol)    * 
Contract (including standard regulation)  *  * 
Covenant  *  * 
Financial instruments     
Subsidies * * * * 
Tax measures *  *  
Financial incentives apart from tax measures  
(own contributions to insurance and funds, financial levies)  
    
Vouchers *  *  
Credit facilities/guarantees *  *  
Budget control     
Performance control    * 
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Communicattion instruments     
Information (generic and specific)  * *   
Knowledge and research * *  * 
Quality mark  *  * 
Certification    * 
Recognition regulation  *  * 
Benchmark    * 
Reward instruments (naming and faming)  *   
Interactive policy development  *   
Organisational instruments     
Taskforce  *   
Experiment  *   
Visits  *  * 
Ombudsman function    * 
Mediation    * 
Monitoring authorities    * 
Quality guarantee system  *  * 
Physical facilities     
Instruments which remotely place an activity      
Invitation to tender     
Self sufficiency (semi public body )     
Privatisation     
Instruments to support self-governance     
Indicators and justification systems    * 
Monitoring and benchmarking    * 
Quality control    * 
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Further information about policy instruments 
 
Legal instruments 
- Regulations 
Through legislation, the national government directly obliges citizens/com-
panies to policy-compliant behaviour and prohibits undesired behaviour. In 
principle, legislation is associated with enforcement. 
- Permit system 
Legislation and regulations can be planned in such a way that certain behav-
iour is forbidden unless permission has been expressly granted, usually in 
the form of a permit system. Permission can be granted by the government 
and mandated to other authorities. 
- Agreements 
Businesses and social organisations can reach agreements with each other, 
for example in the form of certification systems or codes of conduct. Such 
agreement systems can take the form of government regulation (for which 
legislation is required) or self-regulation. 
- Contract 
Here we refer to binding agreements as contracts. The government enters 
into delivery contracts with one or more citizens or businesses in which the 
enforcement of rights and obligations is described. 
- Covenant 
Here we refer to limited binding agreements as covenants. To some extent, 
covenants often have an intentional character and can be relatively easily 
terminated. 
 
Financial instruments 
- Subsidies 
Through subsidies to citizens, institutions and businesses, the government 
wants to contribute to the financing of facilities or activities which are de-
sired in terms of policy. The subsidy instrument requires monitoring of the 
resources, whereby the intensity of the monitoring also depends on the na-
ture of the subsidy rules. 
- Tax measures 
Through tax measures, the government stimulates citizens, institutions and 
businesses to comply with policy or discourages them from undesired 
behaviour. 
- Financial incentives other than tax measures 
Through financial incentives, the government stimulates citizens, institutions 
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and businesses to comply with policy or discourages them from undesired 
behaviour. 
- Vouchers 
Through a voucher, citizens or organisations are given the right to use a 
product or service at a reduced rate. The aim is that this introduction results 
in the desired change of behaviour. 
- Credit facilities and guarantees 
Credit facilities can be granted to businesses and institutions - either through 
the banks or not - if the financing is a problem for organising the desired fa-
cilities or implementing the desired activities (for example research). 
- Performance governance 
Performance governance is directed at the desired outcomes by means of 
an agreement between the principal and contractor. Through performance 
governance, policy goals can be achieved. The principal has a great influ-
ence on performance because he can link sanctions to not achieving per-
formance agreements. It is an instrument which supports self-governance 
(see also the category instruments supporting self-governance). 
 
Communication??? instruments 
- Information (generic or specific) 
Information is provided about subjects relevant to the policy and the target 
group. It may relate to the policy itself and/or behavioural issues (stimulating 
desired behaviour). Although the effectiveness of information activities is dif-
ficult to measure objectively, information is an inextricable part of policy and 
of influencing behaviour. 
- Knowledge and research 
Behaviour or attitudes in society can partly be steered by knowledge. For 
this reason, knowledge is gathered. Obviously 'knowledge' is followed up by 
information: the spreading of knowledge. 
- Quality mark 
Quality marks are used to communicate about product quality: for consum-
ers and businesses, a quality mark acts as guarantee that a product fulfils 
certain quality standards. For businesses and organisations, a quality mark 
is part of the marketing. 
- Certification 
Certification is the process with which a product, service, process or person 
is assessed by an independent party on certain specific requirements deter-
mined in advance. The certificate is the document which confirms this fact. 
Certification can also be a system whereby a private institution is qualified 
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by the government to carry out certain tasks which are considered to be the 
responsibility of the government. 
- Legal recognition 
Regulations whereby the activities of companies are assessed according to 
a number of qualitative criteria. If the company meets the requirements, it 
may call itself 'recognised' and publicise the fact that it is recognised to the 
public (see also quality mark). 
- Benchmark 
The benchmark instrument is used to compare products and services of 
similar organisations. This stimulates suppliers to improve their quality and 
consumers can make informed choices between products and services 
being offered. 
- Interactive policy development 
Policy development in consultation with the target group, for example via 
platforms or panels can contribute to the support for new policy and thus 
have a positive effect on its implementation. 
 
Organisational instruments 
- Taskforce 
The taskforce is a temporary cooperation between public and private organ-
isations to achieve a certain goal. The taskforce's assignment may vary, 
such as policy development, social agenda and/or knowledge development. 
- Experiment 
An experiment investigates in practice whether a certain working method, 
regulation, et cetera is satisfactory and can be improved. Often, abolition of 
current regulations is required for an experiment. 
- Comparison 
Similar organisations can compare each other's results/performance. The 
comparison can be organised within the branch and by external people and 
aims at stimulating improvement in performance. It can be organised without 
government intervention. 
- Quality guarantee system 
This concerns mutual regulations within private sectors whereby quality is 
guaranteed for customers. This could relate to norms and procedures for 
admission to sector organisations or to chain guarantee systems. 
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Physical provisions 
The government can provide physical provisions to enable/stimulate policy-
related behaviour. 
 
Instruments which place an activity at a distance 
- Tender 
In a tender procedure, the principal selects an organisation from several 
candidates to do certain work, provide a service or delivery.  
- Independent bodies 
In this case, it concerns a government organisation becoming independent 
or being transformed into a private company. The work or tasks of privat-
ised government bodies are still the responsibility of the Minister. Privat-
isation should take place according to the guidelines recorded in the 
Framework Act for Independent Government Bodies. 
- Privatisation 
Privatisation is the process whereby public assets are transferred to private 
hands, when the execution of a public task is outsourced to one or more pri-
vate parties (market parties) or if part or all of the government organisation 
which is responsible for a public task is converted into a private organisa-
tion. It might also be that the government no longer considers striving to ful-
fil a certain interest to be a public task, whereas privatisation generates 
funds for the treasury. 
 
Instruments to support self-governance (Baarsma, 2003) 
- Indicators and justification systems 
- Performance indicators are related to delivered end products; 
- Use indicators are related to consumers of services; 
- Process indicators are related to the work performed or to intermediate  
 products; 
- Input indicators are related to the resources used. 
For self-governance, performance indicators are the main indicators used.  
- Monitoring and benchmarking 
Monitoring is about comparing results of an organisation at different mo-
ments. Monitoring results are used to evaluate regulations of agreements 
and if possible to adjust them. 
Benchmarking is the systematic comparing of organisations based on indi-
cators determined in advance whereby best practice can be established 
which serves the improvement of the organisation. 
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- Quality control 
Self-governance becomes easier the greater the reliability and responsive-
ness of the organisation to be governed. Quality instruments can contribute 
to optimal adjustment by the government. Examples of quality instruments 
are customer surveys, quality monitor, complaint registration, customer 
councils. 
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Appendix 3 
Elaboration of a framework based on a case 
 
 
In order to gain more insight into the motivation for government intervention and 
how the policy framework works, a case is elaborated to demonstrate the appli-
cation of the theory.  
 In summary, the case involves the following: 
- Trader P from Portugal exports wooden products and residual products 
(bark) to the Netherlands. Tree nurseryman B grows Pine and sells the bark 
for his crop protection. Parasite X is in the bark and parasite X is harmful for 
the Pine. The damage increases as the climatological conditions start to 
resemble those of Portugal. One side of tree nurseryman B's business 
borders tree nurseryman C's business, while on the other side there is a 
strip of public green space adjacent to a woodland area owned by nature 
management of organisation S. Tree nurseryman B sells his Pines to 
customer N in Norway. 
 
 Boxes B.1 to B.4 demonstrate the effects of the introduction of X into the 
Netherlands and why the market fails to correct it. For Boxes B.2 and B.4, the 
steps of the framework are followed to see how the government can interpret 
the control philosophy and which instruments it can use to do so. 
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Box B3.1  Introduction of harmful organism into the Netherlands (ex-
porter P sells his bark to importer and grower B) 
In this case, we only look at the relationship between exporter P and tree nurseryman B. 
There are no effects for third parties. What goes wrong? 
 
Information asymmetry 
The following situations could occur: 
- Situation 1: Exporter P does not know that his products are infested with parasite X and a) 
could not reasonably have known or b) should have known. 
- Situation 2: Exporter P is aware of the infestation, but does not tell grower B. 
 
Reason for government intervention? 
There is a welfare loss as a result of information asymmetry and external effects. The welfare 
loss consists in the first instance of damage tree nurseryman B who suffers production loss 
because some of his Pines die. In the long term, this leads to a reduction in the volume of 
transactions and possibly reduced competitive position for the grower. In this case, there is a 
one-to-one relationship between exporter and grower, whereby in situation 1b and situation 2 
an economic incentive is present for both the exporter and the grower to prevent welfare 
loss. In this situation, there is no reason for the government to intervene and it can leave it to 
the exporter and grower to minimise the welfare loss. For example, the grower may request 
a certificate from the producer whereby the producer declares that his products are 'clean'. 
In situation 1a, the government can take the attitude that like visible or proven harmful infes-
tations, non-visible infestations are part of the risk for the exporter and grower and leave any 
measures to the sector. They can work together on knowledge development and a test 
method; the exporter can try to insure himself against liability resulting from the sale of in-
fested products. On the other hand, such measures are difficult to implement because the 
development of knowledge and test techniques are expensive and time consuming and the 
benefits are not only felt by one individual but the entire sector and even society (positive ex-
ternal effects with free rider behaviour). Through reverse selection and moral risk, the insur-
ance referred to is also difficult to implement in the market.  
 
Method of government intervention 
In the case of situation 1a, there is insufficient knowledge of the organism. The organism can 
also affect public interests. The government should therefore ensure that there is sufficient 
information about the risks.  
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Box B3.2a  Distribution within the sector (harmful organism spreads from 
grower B to grower C) 
External effects 
Due to the introduction of parasite X in the Netherlands via grower B, there is a risk that the 
animal spreads to other neighbouring businesses, for example to grower C. This could cause 
production loss and or increases in production costs for grower C, thus threatening his com-
petitive position. The transaction of Pines between exporter P and tree nurseryman B thus al-
so has consequences for the neighbour. Here there is an external effect.  
 
Reason for government intervention? 
Grower C benefits from grower B minimising the risk of introducing infested products, but will 
not be immediately prepared to pay compensation to grower B as 'measures to reduce the 
risk' have the character of a public good with positive external effects. As soon as grower C 
knows that parasite X has been found at the business of grower B, there is reason for grow-
er C to protect himself against contamination, for example by using preventative pesticides. 
If parasite X is also found at the business of grower C, he may incur significant damage which 
he will want to claim from grower B. However, if grower C can also find himself in the situa-
tion of grower B, he has other interests and would be more prepared to 'pay' for measures to 
reduce the risk of contamination. In other words: if grower C also runs the risk of introducing 
a harmful organism through his business (importing plant products or residual products), he 
will be more prepared to facilitate good 'measures to reduce the risk'.  
 
Method of government intervention 
The above shows the situation whereby the introduction of a private good (bark) is linked with 
negative external effects (risk of infestation and actual contamination). There is a subsequent 
need to introduce 'measures to limit the risk' aimed at restricting the negative effects which 
is linked with positive external effects. In view of the emergence of external effects, the 
market mechanism will fail. However, dealing with the market failure is not necessarily a task 
for the government, because it has occurred within a sector (growers) and they have the 
greatest interest in correcting this failure, assuming they have the possibilities. The sector 
acts instead of the government as collective promoter of interests and a system can emerge 
via self-regulation, whereby all interest are satisfactorily taken into account. The government 
can stimulate the process of self-regulation and provide support by means of subsidies, 
knowledge development or possibly by adjusting regulations and declare measures to be 
generally binding.  
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Box B3.2a  Distribution within the sector (harmful organism spreads from 
grower B to grower C) (continued) 
Imagine grower B and grower C together form the entire sector, then it is in the interest of 
the government that together they reach a good solution, otherwise the competitive power of 
the entire sector will be in danger. According to Figure 4.3, it may be expected that the sec-
tor benefits from a solution. When B is proved to have been negligent, he can be held liable 
for the damage, particularly when the need to provide evidence of imputability lies with grow-
er B. In that case, there is sufficient incentive for grower B to prevent this in the future and 
further government intervention is not required. This appeals for the government to choose 
self-governance and leave determining the aim to the chain parties and sector. A considera-
tion for the government to wish to play a certain role relates to the environment objectives a). 
Private and public interests do not totally correspond if measures to prevent contamination 
create negative external effects for the environment and thus welfare loss for citizens.  
Imagine that one of the criteria for determining whether the sector is able to take collec-
tive measures is not complied with, for example there are no instruments available to reveal 
the presence of the harmful organism in the product, then free self-governance will not be 
applied without due consideration. The government must then decide whether, and if so, what 
role it wishes to play with regard to the knowledge development for such an instrument; only 
financing/co-financing or also producing. Network governance is the more obvious solution, 
until all the conditions for self-governance are fulfilled.  
a) In the case of lack of marketing activity, the economic and environmental goals are drawn up by the government 
and these form the outcome of a social/political debate during which all the interests of the citizens are weighed 
up by the government. This also applies to the government goals regarding nature & landscape and biodiversity in 
Box B.3. 
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Box B3.2b  Distribution between sectors (harmful organism spreads from 
one sector (sector A) to another sector (sector B)) 
External effects 
Once parasite X is widespread in sector B, it is possible that other sectors will also be 
infested, such as sector B. In this case, sector B will suffer loss of production and possibly 
additional costs as a result of harmful organism caused by trade between the exporter and 
grower B; a negative external effect. 
 
Reason for government intervention? 
The reasoning followed in Box B.2a is the same as the reasoning which can be followed for 
2b, the difference being that two different sectors are involved rather than growers. Here 
too, the government will absorb the market failure and the sectors will look together for pos-
sibilities to correct the failure as they both have an interest herein. Economic and environ-
mental interests may be a reason for the government to ultimately intervene.  
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Box B3.3  Distribution to the green space 
External effects 
If parasite X spreads to the green space, it can damage trees which consequently become 
diseased or die. This may have negative consequences for the landscape (dying pine forests 
lead to gaps in the landscape), nature (for example birds and insects which depend on these 
trees) and sometimes even the biodiversity as threatened species become endangered. 
 
Reason for government intervention? 
As described in Chapter 3, nature & landscape and biodiversity are public goods and will not 
be created by themselves or, in this case, be preserved. Growers B and C have no economic 
incentive to protect the green space against parasite X, unless the government intervenes. 
It is generally accepted in society that the government is responsible for protecting nature 
and landscape and biodiversity to meet the needs of its citizens for nature, landscape and 
biodiversity.  
 
Method of government intervention 
Application of Figure 4.3 means that there is both private and public interest, but that these 
do not correspond with each other. Network governance is only effective if both the govern-
ment and the sector and the nature and landscape parties in the field are focused on consen-
sus and both wish to resolve the problem. Another condition is that there is sufficient time for 
consultation. If the organism is introduced and spreads within a short space of time, it may 
be opportune for the government to choose hierarchical governance and to impose meas-
ures. In the case of parasite X, the risk of damage to nature increases in proportion to how 
the climate conditions begin to resemble those in Portugal, so there seems to be enough 
time to consult with the parties involved. 
It is also important whether there are opportunities to intervene. It is very possible that 
effective measures at business level cannot be applied in the green area. In that case, the 
government will then have to take responsibility for effective counter measures. 
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Box B3.4  Export (grower B exports to buyers in Norway) 
External effects  
Contamination of products with parasite X or even the suspicion of contamination can result 
in buyers refusing to buy any product from the alleged contaminated area. Even once the 
parasite has been eliminated, turnover can decline as a result of loss of image. Other 
growers as well as grower B may then suffer the negative effects of the contamination.  
If the potential buyers collectively decide not to buy any products from Dutch growers, 
this can lead to a massive loss of competitive power in the whole sector which can then im-
pact on the Dutch economy.  
  
Reason for government intervention? 
The welfare loss initially affects grower B and grower B will be motivated to take measures to 
prevent it. There is no role for the government here. However, the negative consequences 
may extend beyond grower B and affect the whole sector and thus directly affect the eco-
nomic objectives of the Dutch government (employment opportunities, good competitive  
position, et cetera). Analogous to the reasoning in Box B.2, there may be a reason for the 
government to actively promote the economic interests of its citizens.  
 
Method of government intervention 
In this case too, the sector will be motivated to prevent loss of its competitive position, and 
therefore deploy instruments to stimulate entrepreneurs to take the right measures, which 
can be achieved through self-governance. 
 
Conclusion 
As long as the costs and the benefits involved in taking phytosanitary measures 
are in proportion for the sector (whether individual or collective market parties), 
in other words there is an economic incentive, then in principle there is no for 
the government to assume an active role in correcting market failure and it can 
leave this role to the sector. However, assuming that society also benefits from 
preventing contamination by parasite X due to the negative external effects, the 
government will want to intervene in some way. The more public interests or 
public goods are involved, the more active the role of the government. The de-
pendence of other parties to achieve its goal will also determine whether the 
government chooses hierarchical governance or rather a form of governance 
which corresponds with its approach. 
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Appendix 4 
Description of International Plant Protection Convention 
and EU Phytosanitary Directive  
 
 
International Plant Protection Convention 
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is an international plant 
health agreement, established by the FAO in 1952 that aims to protect cultivat-
ed and wild plants by preventing the introduction and spread of pests. The con-
tracting parties (163 countries in 2007) undertake to appoint a national plant 
protection organisation which is responsible for various tasks, setting up a  
phytosanitary certification system, cooperating in international consortia, partic-
ipating in the relevant regional organisation for plant protection and complying 
with the international standards for phytosanitary measures (ISPM) drawn up by 
the Committee for Phytosanitary Measures (CPM). For Europe, the regional or-
ganisation is the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation 
(EPPO). EPPO promotes the exchange and acquisition of knowledge and facili-
tates national plant protection organisations by providing technical support for 
phytosanitary measures, research into sustainable and effective plant protection 
measures and harmonisation of scientific methods and procedures. 
 
European regulation; Directive 2000/29/EC on protective measures against 
the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant 
products and their spread within the Community 
The community regulation relating to phytosanitary measures aims to prevent 
the introduction or spread of organisms harmful to plants or plant products with-
in the Community. In order to achieve the above goal, the member states have 
both the right and the duty to regulate traffic on their national territory and the 
introduction from third countries in the Community of plants and plant products. 
There are also obligations for third countries which wish to export plants or 
plant products to the Community. The regulation is recorded in Council Directive 
2000/29/EC. The general principles are based on provisions established in the 
International Convention for the Protection of Plants (IPPC) of the Food and Agri-
culture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and in the WTO agreement re-
garding sanitary and phytosanitary measures (European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/policies/agriculture_fisheries_food_nl.htm). 
 The Directive is aimed at prevention as well as tackling harmful organisms.  
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Contents of the Directive 
 
Prevention  
 
Trade within the Member States 
Council Directive 2000/29/EC regulates trade within the Member States of cer-
tain plants, plant products and other materials which could potentially be the 
carrier of harmful organisms which generate risks for the whole of the Commu-
nity (incorporated in part A of Appendix V). These plants, plant products and 
other materials are generally of great economic importance. They are subjected 
to specific conditions regarding monitoring of the production: more inspections 
are carried out on the production site at the most suitable moment, i.e. during 
the growing season and immediately after harvesting. All producers of the ma-
terial in part A of Appendix V must therefore be included in an official register. 
The plants, plant products and other materials must also be accompanied by 
a plant passport during transport. That document proves that the materials 
have passed the Community inspections and replaces the phytosanitary certifi-
cate used for trade between the member states before the internal market was 
created.  
 
Trade between countries outside the Community (third countries) and the 
Member States of the Community 
Council Directive 2000/29/EC contains provisions concerning the compulsory 
phytosanitary inspections of certain plants and plant products (included in part B 
of Appendix V) from third countries. This concerns checks of the documents, 
identity and phytosanitary inspections which guarantee compliance with the 
general and specific community conditions for import. 
- During checks of the documents, the certificates and documents accompa-
nying the shipment and in particular the phytosanitary certificate are verified. 
This must have been issued by the competent authority in the country of 
origin or re-export and correspond with the International Plant Protection 
Convention. These documents must confirm that the product complies with 
the specific conditions imposed by the Community.  
- Identity controls check that the plants or plant products in the shipment cor-
respond with those listed in the certificate.  
- Based on an inspection of part or all of the shipment, the phytosanitary 
checks confirm that the shipment is free of harmful organisms.  
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 Phytosanitary checks can be limited if this is deemed responsible according 
to the Commission's decision schedule. 
 Directive 2000/29/EC determines that the Member States arrange the col-
lection of phytosanitary charges to cover the costs of extensive checks of the 
documents and the identity and the phytosanitary inspections. In principle, the 
charges due correspond with the inspectors' salaries, the costs of the tests 
and the administrative charges. The charges are paid by the importer or his 
Customs representative. 
 Measures in the case of non-compliance of import: 
- Refusal to allow the import of the whole or part of the shipment into the 
Community;  
- Transfer under official supervision, according to the appropriate Customs 
procedure during transfer within the Community, to a destination outside 
the Community;  
- Refusal of contaminated/affected products from the shipment;  
- Destruction;  
- Imposition of quarantine until the results of official tests are available.  
 
Import into the EU of packaging material made from wood and for dunnage  
The Community measures are aligned with the international norms of the FAO 
for phytosanitary measures regarding the Guidelines for regulating wood pack-
aging material in international trade. According to this norm, wood packaging 
material must be treated and provided with a quality mark. It also states that 
countries can require that the material is made from debarked wood, as long as 
there is a technical reason. 
 
Measures 
Tackling harmful organisms in the Community is an important part of the Com-
munity's phytosanitary regulations. Specific measures related to: 
- harmful organisms found in the Community for the first time;  
- harmful organisms found in Member States which were unaware of their 
existence until then;  
- other harmful organisms whose existence was not yet known in the Com-
munity, which are not specifically mentioned in Directive 2000/29/EC, but 
which could have an economic impact.  
 
 The member states must notify the Community and other member states 
about the presence of these harmful organisms in their country and take meas-
ures to eradicate the relevant organism or, if this is impossible, to prevent its 
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spread. When a member state feels that there is a danger that a harmful or-
ganism might be introduced or spread, it must inform the Commission and the 
other member states about the measures it wishes taken and can also take 
temporary additional measures. When the danger is related to shipments of 
plants, plant products or other materials from third countries, the Member State 
must immediately take measures to protect the Community against that danger 
and inform the Commission and the other member states thereof. In these cas-
es, the Community can take temporary emergency measures. The Commission 
must investigate the situation as quickly as possible and community counter 
measures can be approved.  
 
Protected areas 
Protected areas are Community areas which, at the request of the relevant 
member state(s), can be given special protection against the introduction of one 
or more harmful organisms referred to in Directive 2000/29/EC. These areas 
are protected because the relevant harmful organism does not occur there, 
although the environmental factors in the protected area are favourable for its 
development. In certain cases, the harmful organism is present in the protected 
zone, but it is eradicated. A protected area might comprise an entire member 
state, or just part of one. Each area is individually assessed for each specific 
harmful organism. By applying the appropriate community measures and con-
ducting annual investigations, the Member States concerned can ensure that the 
protected areas remain free from the relevant harmful organism(s). 
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